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Abstract 
In multilevel systems, organized interests, including business firms, can pursue their political 
goals at different levels. At the same time, national systems of interest representation provide 
important incentive structures and normative and institutional contexts for business political 
behaviour. In this context, business political strategy is guided by firms’ perceptions of their 
relationship with policymakers. If this relationship is under strain in one venue, firms shift 
their lobbying effort to alternative venues within the political system, subject to constraints 
reflecting national institutional legacies. Using survey data on 56 large German and British 
firms, we investigate empirically how perceptions of government-business relations and 
national systems of interest representation interact to shape the political behaviour of large 
firms in multilevel systems. Our analysis shows that perceived conflict between firms and 
public authorities at the national level leads to increased business lobbying at the EU level. 
We also find that national institutions and types of interest representation shape relative 
business engagement at the EU level as well as the readiness of firms to shift venue.  
 
Key words 
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In multilevel systems, organized interests, including firms, have opportunities to pursue their 
political goals at different levels of government. This allows them to focus their advocacy 
effort on institutional venues that they perceive as biased in their favour while avoiding those 
in which their political standing is poor (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Beyers and Kerremans 
2012; Eising et al. 2017: this volume). At the same time, nation states continue to provide 
important incentive structures and normative and institutional contexts for business political 
behaviour. Traditionally, the link between national systems of interest representation and EU 
lobbying has been conceptualized as the relationship between organized interests, typically 
business and labour, and national governments (Cowles 2001). The national institutional 
environment of business-government relations has been defined by the dichotomy of (neo-
)corporatism and pluralism (Crouch 1985; Schmitter 1974; Siaroff 1999). Firms embedded in 
corporatist systems have been found to rely on more encompassing groups to represent their 
interests in the EU and to be less likely to have the institutionalized capacity to lobby on their 
own (Grant 1993; Greenwood 2003: 23-4). While the EU’s system of interest representation 
has been found to contain corporatist elements (see Falkner 1998; Poletti et al. 2015), the 
literature overwhelmingly characterizes the EU as more pluralist than corporatist (Coen 1997; 
Cowles 1998; Cowles 1996; Bennett 1997; Streeck and Schmitter 1991). 
 
The EU’s ‘elite pluralism’ (Coen 1997) has been found to make the EU system more congenial 
to the political aspirations of firms from pluralist than from corporatist backgrounds 
(Greenwood 2003: 23-4; Mazey and Richardson 1993: 199). However, more recent research 
on business lobbying in the EU questions the continued impact of national modes of interest 
representation and mediation. Analysing the role of corporatism in predicting direct lobbying, 
Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009: 172) found that ‘at the level of the EU such differences no 
longer matter where business interests are concerned.’ In this paper, we propose that the 
national institutional context continues to shape business political behaviour in the multilevel 
system of the EU, but in more complex ways than have hitherto been considered. To this end, 
we focus on an aspect of government-business relations that should matter in the decision 
process of business lobbyists in any system of interest representation, albeit in different ways: 
their perception of how good or strained their relationship to policymakers is. Thus, we 
investigate the extent to which perceptions of conflict between business actors and public 
authorities lead to venue shifts in lobbying activity. We want to find out whether poor 
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perceived relations at the national level prompt firms to increase their lobbying activities at 
the supranational level and to what extent such strategic behaviour is affected by the national 
institutional context. 
 
We pursue these questions empirically using survey data on 56 of the largest German and 
British companies spanning the principal sectors of the European economy. The political 
activities of large firms are of great empirical and normative significance (Hart 2004). 
Exercising substantial power over people as workers and consumers, firms are the leading 
institutions in capitalist society (Hart 2004). Combined with the fact that large firms are 
present in national and supranational European politics (Coen 1997; 1998) this makes them 
an important object of study. As Hart (2004: 48) points out, we cannot hope to understand 
the political role of firms ‘merely by studying peak associations or even trade associations, 
much less interest groups in general.’ In the present article, we focus on firms’ direct political 
activities, as opposed to collective action through business associations. Direct business 
lobbying is a political activity of high and increasing relevance and the object of an established 
research programme in its own right (Coen 1997; 1998; Hart 2004). 
 
Our two country cases - Germany and the UK - enable us to investigate variation in 
institutional environments, above all the domestic system of interest representation. The UK 
represents a pluralist system while Germany represents a moderately corporatist system of 
interest representation (Siaroff 1999). The two countries also provide substantively significant 
examples, representing the two largest EU economies that together comprise almost 40 %, 
respectively, of EU GDP (Eurostat 2016) and of the EU’s largest 300 companies (Dullforce 
2015). Our online survey allows us to measure variables that are notoriously difficult to 
observe – the political activity of firms and the beliefs and perceptions of in-house business 
lobbyists. Our analysis shows that perceived conflict between firms and public authorities at 
the national level leads to increased business lobbying at the EU level. However, the national 
context shapes relative business engagement at the EU level as well as the readiness of firms 
to shift venue. 
 
In the next section, we explain theoretically how the quality of government-business relations 
shapes the lobbying strategies of firms in national and supranational contexts and how this 
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relationship is in turn moderated by the national institutional context. Next, we outline our 
research design, data and analytical strategy. We then present our empirical findings before 
concluding by discussing the evidence in the light of the literature on business lobbying. 
 
Business lobbying, venue shopping and national systems of interest representation 
 
Lobbying is one of several types of political activity pursued by firms. Compared with 
collective action through peak and trade associations, donations to political parties, or 
attempts to influence the opinion of the public and of other external actors through public 
campaigning or philanthropic and ‘socially responsible’ behaviour, direct lobbying is the most 
instrumental political activity for firms, and one which is rather narrowly targeted on specific 
benefits for the firm (Hansen and Mitchell 2000; Hillman and Hitt 1999). The literature on 
business lobbying is centred on a standard profit-maximizing model that provides a simple, 
general and now familiar account of why firms lobby policymakers: government decisions 
about how to use coercive powers and distribute resources have important consequences for 
a firm’s revenues and costs (Grier, Munger and Roberts 1994; Stigler 1971). Some of these 
activities are less common in Europe than in the US, but direct business lobbying is present 
and growing in the EU and its member states. The EU institutions as well as national 
governments all legislate on the terms under which goods and services can be produced and 
traded in the EU, which, if considered a single unit, is the largest economy in the world. It is 
not surprising, then, to find that these important political venues attract considerable 
lobbying activity from firms (Rasmussen and Carroll 2014). 
 
Theories of multilevel governance suggest that firms from EU member countries interact with 
political institutions at both levels (Eising 2004; Kohler-Koch 1997; Marks and Hooghe 2001). 
In order to influence EU policymaking, these firms can lobby at the EU level or at the national 
level or both. Unlike firms from outside the EU, they can seek to enlist national governments 
to represent their interests in EU policy more effectively than firms from non-EU member 
countries do. Following the national route through the British government and the Council of 
Ministers has been identified as an important strategy for British businesses (Bennett 1999). 
In the context of the European End-of Life Automobile Directive, for example, much business 
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lobbying was channelled through national governments (Coen 2005: 202-3). Furthermore, 
some policy struggles of importance to business are fought out at both the national and the 
EU level. This is obvious in the case of EU directives, which need to be transposed into national 
law and thus offer opportunities for lobbying at the stage of transposition. Moreover, most 
EU regulations are implemented by national governments, so that lobbying at the 
implementation stage of EU policy can also take place at the national level. Therefore, as Coen 
(1998: 85) pointed out ‘firms play a complex multilevel game when seeking to influence the 
policy process’. While these analyses concern lobbying after a policy decision is taken at the 
EU level, others point to multilevel venue shopping (Eising et al. 2017: this volume; Kohler-
Koch 1997; Kohler-Koch et al. 2017: this volume; Young and Wallace 2000). And finally, there 
is what Chari and Cavatorta (2002) define as ‘overlap issues’ i.e. ‘issues where two separate, 
but related, domestic and supranational decisions must be taken because they fall within each 
level’s jurisdiction.’ Thus, EU firms can lobby at multiple levels simultaneously, and large 
European firms frequently engage in multilevel lobbying games to influence the European 
policy process. 
 
However, given budget and reputation constraints, rather than playing all relevant 
institutional fields at once, firms and other organised interests have incentives to deploy their 
political resources strategically (Eising 2004). This involves seeking out institutional venues 
they perceive as biased in their favour and avoiding those in which their political standing is 
poor. One strategy for dealing with such biases is to ‘shop’ for an alternative venue and 
attempt to move decision-making authority to a different policy arena. In the words of 
Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 1045), political actors ‘try to alter the roster of participants 
who are involved in the issue by seeking out the most favourable venue for consideration of 
these issues.’ If successful, a change in venue can lead to desired policy change (or, as the 
case may be, help to preserve a preferred status quo). According to Mazey and Richardson 
(2001: 220), political integration in Europe has created a quite new opportunity for venue 
shopping by national and cross-national interest group actors in Europe. Indeed, they argued 
that venue shopping ‘is part of the explanation for the (undisputed) growth in EC/EU level 
interest group formation and lobbying’ (Mazey and Richardson 2001: 220). While 
Baumgartner and Jones developed the concept of venue shopping for the analysis of public 
policymaking in the US, Mazey and Richardson (2001) maintain that the EU’s system of 
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multiple access points created by institutionalised multilevel governance makes venue 
shopping a fruitful analytical lens for the analysis of lobbying in this polity. Others agree in 
principle but point out an important difference: in the multilevel system of the EU, where 
different institutions at different levels of government are involved in the policy process, 
venue shopping takes the form of concentrating the lobby effort on one of several possible 
levels without actually shifting decision-making to different venues (Beyers and Kerremans 
2012). As Princen and Kerremans (2008: 1139) put it, ‘Interest groups may choose between 
venues but the venues themselves are given’. Moreover, while the US literature has been 
dominated by analyses of horizontal shifts at one and the same level of government (see 
Holyoke. 2012 for an overview), the political system of the EU is more encouraging of vertical 
venue shifts between levels of government. The analysis that follows is concerned with the 
logic behind these vertical venue shifts. 
 
For large firms, incentives to shift lobbying efforts to different venues can stem from changes 
in the political standing of firms within the political system. Firstly, for business as a whole, 
the public mood may be more sympathetic or less. For example, when citizens and 
policymakers perceive the economy as doing well, they may be more willing to demand 
policies that are costly to business. This explains part of the ‘fluctuating fortunes’ of business 
over time (Vogel 1989). Secondly, different sectors are affected to different degrees by public 
decision-making (Grier, Munger and Roberts 1994), and at any given time some sectors enjoy 
better relations with policymakers than others. And thirdly, individual firms may find their 
relationship with policymakers more or less conducive to their political goals, where this 
relationship may be shaped by past interactions with policymakers or the extent to which 
firms have been subject to individual administrative decisions, e.g. in the field of competition 
policy and merger control, commercial supervision, licencing, or procurement. As Holyoke 
(2003: 326) pointed out, ‘[b]because each venue contains a different set of government 
officials, the quality of the relationships between a group’s lobbyist and these policymakers 
is likely to vary from venue to venue.’ Jointly, these factors determine the degree of 
attractiveness of a political market, which, according to Bonardi, Hillman and Keim (2005: 
398) accounts for why a firm engages in political activities. Thus, firms have incentives to shift 
their political effort away from venues where government-business relations are conflictual 
to those venues were these relations are more harmonic.  
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Proposition 1: As national government-business relations deteriorate; firms increase 
their lobbying at the EU level relative to national-level lobbying. 
 
However, it would be overly simplistic to expect firms headquartered in different countries 
and systems of interest representation to make strategic choices among multiple venues 
independently of the wider political context and the opportunities and constraints that this 
presents. Firms, like other political actors, are ‘embedded’ in social relations (Granovetter 
1992). As a result, enduring differences can be observed among types of national capitalisms, 
which ensure that strategies in areas such as research and development, financing, and 
internal corporate governance remain nationally distinct. With respect to these areas, Pauly 
and Reich (1997: 1) report that ‘recent evidence shows little blurring or convergence at the 
cores of firms based in Germany, Japan, or the United States’. We submit that these national 
differences extend to business political strategies too. Holding the political venue constant, 
implications of such embeddedness have been explored with respect to the political 
behaviour of affiliates of foreign corporations in Washington DC (Rehbein 1995) and Brussels 
(Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Coen 2005; Grant 1993). While Grant (1993: 171-2) found 
enduring differences between British and German firms, Rehbein (1995) reports strong 
similarities between the political strategies of foreign-owned and domestic firms. Similarly, 
Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) found little support for the continued role of nationally 
distinct types of interest representation. 
 
These contradictory and seemingly time-sensitive findings call for more careful theorizing of 
the moderating role played by the institutional context. Political scientists have devoted years 
of research to identifying and classifying systems of interest representation and drawing out 
the political and economic consequences for these different systems and the actors operating 
within them (see Siaroff 1999 for a summary). The upshot from this conceptual work is 
widespread agreement that systems of interest representation possess multiple dimensions 
reflecting both interest group characteristics and policy process characteristics. In spite of 
ongoing debate about the precise conceptual boundaries and measurement of this aspect of 
political-economic integration, the theoretical rationale for these concepts is well established 
and its empirical applications have confirmed the robustness of the measurements used 
 8 
 
(Siaroff 1999; Lijphart 1999). Corporatist systems are characterized by relatively few, 
centralized and monopolistic interests with good access to the policymaking process and a 
disposition to compromise and bargain rather than maximize in the policy struggle. Typical 
examples include Austria, Sweden, and Germany. Pluralist systems, by contrast, have 
numerous and competitive organised interests all struggling for access to policymakers. 
Examples include the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. These differences have 
implications for unmediated firm lobbying generated by different national contexts. At the 
national level, more corporatist systems are characterized by a relatively low frequency of 
individual firm lobbying. Interests are centralized and monopolistic and the policy process 
characterized by national bargaining between the government, representatives of business 
and representatives of labour. 
 
This logic extends to other policy arenas. While the EU’s system of interest representation has 
been found to contain corporatist elements (see Falkner 1998; Poletti et al. 2015), these lack 
the quasi-public functions assigned to major interest groups in a corporatist setting. The most 
important socioeconomic decisions are still made at the national level or subject to national 
veto (Lijphart 1999: 44); and the European Economic and Social Committee has a purely 
advisory role. Accordingly, the EU is widely characterized as an ‘elite pluralist arrangement 
between institutions and policy actors’ (Coen, 1997, see also Cowles 1998; Cowles 1996; 
Bennett 1997; Streeck and Schmitter 1991). In this environment, firms from pluralist systems 
that had developed the institutional capacity and experience to represent their own interests 
were argued to be well positioned for lobbying in the European policy arena: ‘Anglo and 
American firms in particular, familiar with operating in pluralist environments, are used to 
operating outside groups … whereas those used to the corporatist traditions of Germanic 
countries tend to place greater emphasis upon associations’ (Greenwood 2003: 23-4). 
Similarly, Mazey and Richardson (1993: 199) found that, alongside American groups, British 
organisations were ‘widely regarded as being among the most enthusiastic EC lobbyists’. By 
contrast, firms embedded in highly corporatist systems rely more heavily on encompassing 
groups to represent their interests in the EU and are less likely to develop the institutionalized 
capacity to lobby on their own. Thus, twenty years ago, Grant (1993: 15) noted that, in 
comparison to the US and the UK where firms have developed government relations offices, 
‘[g]overnment relations divisions are relatively unknown in Germany’. 
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However, the findings by Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) suggest that firms from corporatist 
systems have caught up with the EU lobbying activity of their peers from pluralist systems. If 
this is an ongoing trend, another decade on we might now see firms from corporatist 
countries be even more inclined to lobby at the EU level than their peers from pluralist 
political economies. Moreover, it has been argued that corporatism makes EU-level interest 
representation more attractive to business in relative terms, because it empowers 
countervailing interests at the national level (Hix 2005: 265; see also Marks and McAdam 1996 
for a similar argument). As corporatism gives organized labour a permanent seat at the 
bargaining table and easy access to policymakers, it provides business interests with 
incentives to shift policy debates away from the national level. Both arguments imply that 
firms from countries with corporatist systems of interest representation have now greater 
incentives to lobby at the EU level.  
 
Proposition 2: Firms headquartered in corporatist countries place a greater emphasis 
on EU level lobbying relative to national level lobbying than firms from pluralist 
countries.  
 
While national systems of interest representation and the incentives they provide for 
business political strategies have been changing, their basic structures endure. Moreover, a 
lasting effect has been that the late developers from corporatist countries have had to 
develop greater flexibility and a broader strategic action repertoire compared to their 
pluralist peers. The latter’s institutional background had already equipped them rather well 
for lobbying in the context of the EU’s élite pluralism (Coen 1997), thus demanding little ability 
to develop adaptation skills. These differences in the institutional context of German and 
British firms affect the way in which firms decide to switch venues when facing less than 
harmonic government-business relations at the national level of the home country.  
 
However, the fact that large firms from pluralist systems are significant players in EU 
policymaking (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Greenwood 2007; Mazey and Richardson 1993) 
suggests that there must be circumstances under which these firms shift lobbying activity to 
the EU level the same way firms from corporatist systems do. As Princen and Kerremans 
(2008: 1137) point out, venue shopping is not a cost-free activity. Moreover, policy advocates 
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may ‘stick to national institutional venues because they lack strong institutional allies at the 
EU level’ (Princen and Kerremans 2008: 1137). While for British firms the perception of 
conflict at the national level is not a sufficient condition to switch lobbying venues, they might 
do so in circumstances when a relatively supportive policy environment can be expected at 
the EU level (see Eising et al. 2017: this volume; Kohler-Koch et al. 2017: this volume). This 
rationale and its behavioural implications apply to firms from pluralist and corporatist systems 
alike. However, only for the former is it a necessary condition for changing venue. 
 
Proposition 3: Firms from pluralist countries are less ready than firms from corporatist 
countries to abandon the national route in favour of EU lobbying when national 
government-business relations deteriorate. 
 
By contrast, pull as well as push factors should play a similar role for firms from any system of 
interest representation. Ehrlich and Jones (2016) argue that firms located in countries where 
it is more costly for them to lobby are more likely to lobby at the EU level. These authors 
expect that ‘the more receptive access points are, on average, to a particular interest, the 
cheaper lobbying will be for that interest and, thus, the more that interest should lobby’ 
(2016, 473). We generalize this expectation and argue that firms decide to directly lobby the 
EU when doing so promises to be relatively more beneficial to them than lobbying at the 
national level. Thus, when taking into account how welcoming the target venue is expected 
to be by the firm considering a venue shift, we expect  
 
Proposition 4: Firms from any system of interest representation transfer their lobbying 
effort from the national to the EU level in response to increases in national conflict 
relative to that found at the EU level.  
 
Data and Research Strategy 
 
To evaluate these propositions empirically, we collected information on the political activities 
for a sample of 56 large corporations headquartered in Germany and the UK in late 2015 and 
2016. While the data we can use to evaluate our positions thus consist of cross-sectional 
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measurements at a single point in time, a certain temporal order is implied in the theoretical 
argument presented above. While social scientists tend to think of causality in terms changes 
in X producing changes in Y, covariation between these two variables can also be the result 
of a third process in which some third factor, perhaps in existence prior to both X and Y, causes 
changes in the association between X and Y (Miller 1999: 121). Working with cross-sectional 
data we evaluate our causal arguments with the aid of observable implications of a cross-
sectional nature. To this end, we derive the following testable hypotheses about statistical 
associations in cross-sectional data from our four propositions above: 
 
H1: The more conflictual government-business relations are at the national level, the 
more firms lobby at the EU level relative to the national level. 
 
H2: Firms headquartered in Germany place a relatively greater emphasis on EU-level 
lobbying than firms headquartered in the UK.  
 
H3: The effect of conflictual government-business relations at the national level on 
relative EU lobbying is greater for German firms than for British firms. 
 
H4: For firms from both countries, there is a positive association between relative EU 
lobbying and national conflict relative to EU-level conflict.  
 
The country selection enables us to assess the effects of corporatist and pluralist systems of 
interest representation.1 The sample was drawn in 2013 from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ 
database. The database contains financial and structural data on about 70,000 publically 
traded and more than 700,000 privately owned companies from all over the world. From this 
source, which served as our population frame, we sampled the 100 largest corporations, 
respectively, from each of the two countries.2 For this purpose, we have created a size ranking 
based on the average of rankings by revenues, profits, assets and employee numbers.3 To 
obtain data on the political activities of large firms in the context of domestic and European 
policymaking we have used an online survey of senior managers in the firms’ corporate public 
affairs and public relations departments. Through a lengthy process of online searches and 
telephone enquiries, we obtained contact details, including email addresses, for 146 senior 
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personnel. To maximise response rates, we then sent a hand-signed letter to the personal 
work address of each potential respondent. This was followed up with an email invitation 
containing a link to the survey and, in many cases, several reminders by email and telephone. 
The questionnaire was in the field from 7th December, 2015 until 18th May, 2016. In the end, 
we received 56 complete or almost complete questionnaires, yielding a response rate of 40%. 
The response rates in the two countries was quite similar, with our final sample of 56 split 
into 29 German and 27 British firms. 
 
Through the survey we identified lobbying behaviour and are able to estimate variation across 
the two countries and for different levels of governance (national and EU). To determine 
firms’ relative engagement across national and EU levels of governance, we asked: ‘thinking 
generally about your company’s engagement with policymakers, approximately what 
percentage of your company’s advocacy time is spent’ at a number of venues including ‘EU 
institutions’ and ‘at the national government of country where your company is 
headquartered’.4 To measure relative EU lobbying we divided the percentage of lobbying time 
a firm devotes to EU lobbying by the sum of the percentages of national (HQ) and EU lobbying 
(
% 𝐸𝑈 𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 
% 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 +% 𝐸𝑈 𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔
). This variable can range from 0 to 100, where a value of ‘0’ 
would indicate that a firm only engages in national lobbying (HQ). The distribution of this 
variable is shown in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Central to the assessment of our theoretical claims is the measurement of the perceived 
quality of the relationship between the firm and policymakers at both the national and EU 
level. To gauge this we asked respondents, ‘in general, how would you characterise the 
relationship between your company and public authorities at the national, regional (European 
Union) levels?’ Five response categories were provided: very cooperative, moderately co-
operative, neither co-operative nor conflictual, moderately conflictual, and very conflictual, 
with 1 representing a very cooperative relationship and 5 a very conflictual one. The actual 
values range from 1 to 4 with a mean of 2.3. In addition, as we are also interested in the 
relative quality of government-business relations across national and EU levels, we calculate 
a measure of ‘relative conflict’. This was created by dividing the difference between the 
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variable ‘national conflict’ and a corresponding measure of EU conflict by the total of the two 
measures: (
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 − 𝐸𝑈 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝐸𝑈 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡
). Here higher values indicate greater national conflict 
relative to that encountered at the EU level, with a value of zero (the actual mean) 
representing no difference in conflict across venues.  
 
When estimating the hypothesized associations, we need to take account of other factors 
that may shape firm lobbying at different levels of government and their ability to shift venues 
when circumstances recommend doing so. Large firms with a stake in the policy issue and the 
size to attract the attention of regulators are generally more likely to lobby than smaller ones 
(Boies 1989; Grier, Munger and Roberts 1994). They will also be more likely to lobby at 
different levels of government and better able to shift resources between venues if they need 
to. Thus, we take into account the possibility that lobbying behaviour varies according to 
company size, even within a sample of large companies. To measure firm size, we follow 
established practice in the literature by taking the natural log of revenues in million US Dollars 
for the financial year 2015 (Dullforce 2015).  
 
Furthermore, as mentioned above firms’ incentives to become politically active in a particular 
venue differ by industry sector. At the point of conducting the survey an extensive amount of 
post-crisis financial regulation had just been passed, with a considerable amount of regulatory 
detail left to finalise – increasing the incentives for firms in the financial sector to engage in 
EU level lobbying. Therefore, we control for industrial sector by incorporating an indicator for 
‘financial sector’.5 Finally, given that the majority of the largest German and British firms have 
significant international markets and that many operate large offshore facilities, differences 
in internationalisation may affect the ability of firms to vary their lobby efforts between 
venues. To obtain a measure of international political engagement we return to the 
aforementioned question on the time firms spend across lobbying venues. From the 
responses we construct a measure of ‘foreign CPA (corporate political action)’ - defined as 
the percentage of time spent lobbying ‘national governments of other countries in which your 
company has facilities, markets and/or suppliers’. Empirically, this variable ranges from 0 to 
75 and has a mean of 19.6 Table A1 in the appendix lists summary statistics of all variables. 
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Results 
 
As the data are new, we begin with descriptive overviews of the variables and associations of 
interest. First we consider the mode of interest representation through which firms express 
their positions to policymakers. Of particular interest is whether companies now routinely 
take a direct approach, which suggests a weakening of corporatist modes of encompassing 
interest group representation (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009). Our survey data show that the 
overwhelming majority of firms within our sample (44 out of 56) reported that they directly 
approached policymakers.7 Furthermore, all these firms stated that they had a government 
relations unit. As Figure 2 illustrates, German companies are as likely to approach 
policymakers directly as they are via a trade association, which means they pursue a dual 
strategy of interest representation.8 Nevertheless, there are differences in German and 
British lobbying practices: while UK firms also frequently use the trade associations avenue, 
for them the direct approach is the dominant strategy. The use of consultants, finally, features 
in UK firms’ strategy of engagement, while this mode of interest representation is virtually 
absent in the German part of the sample. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
This picture remains largely intact when we compare the mode of interest representation by 
country and across policy types. For this, we coded responses across the 19 specific policy 
areas, for which firms were asked to indicate their activity, into either regulatory or non-
regulatory policy. The patterns shown in Figure 3 indicate that there is only limited variation 
across policy types, with the exception of UK direct lobbying, which is more pronounced for 
regulatory policies than for non-regulatory policies.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The analysis shown in Figures 4 addresses the question of which level of governance large 
firms direct their lobbying activity towards. The distinction, according to the literature is 
between firms lobbying the policymaking institutions of their country of headquarter and of 
the EU (Bennett 1999; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Grant 1993). The comparison suggests 
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that, while the national arena is an important lobbying venue for firms from both countries, 
the propensity for firms to target the national level rather than the European level is much 
more pronounced for British firms. While German firms are roughly equally active at the 
national (country of headquarter) and EU levels, British firms are more than twice as active at 
the national level than they are at the EU level. This lends initial support to Hypothesis 2.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
The analysis so far has highlighted important and enduring differences between German and 
British business lobbying practises, as well as likely areas of convergence. However, as we 
argue in this paper, when firms engage with policymakers in order to achieve favourable 
outcomes, the quality of the government-business relationship is likely to be critical to 
achieving these goals. Therefore, as hypothesised (H1), when government-business relations 
are poor at the national level the likelihood of firms shifting lobbying attention to the EU level 
will increase. Figure 5 shows mean levels of respondents’ perceived conflict with policymakers 
at the national and EU level, respectively. Higher values indicating greater levels of conflict, 
and lower levels corresponding to a more cooperative relationship. According to our data, 
there is no significant difference between British and German firms, whose mean levels of 
conflict perception range from 2.1 to 2.3 for both levels of government, with identical median 
scores of 2. While average perceptions indicate moderately cooperative to neutral 
relationships, there is considerable variation among firms (see appendix A1) and only a weak 
correlation between national and EU levels of conflict (-0.175). 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
To address our hypotheses directly, we estimate three multivariate regression models with 
bootstrapped standard errors, and firms’ relative EU lobbying (compared to the national level) 
as the dependent variable (see Table 1). All models include variables controlling for firm size 
(revenue (log)), financial sector and foreign CPA. The expectation from Hypothesis 1 is that 
the more conflictual government-business relations are at the national level, the more firms 
lobby at the EU level relative to the national level. This expectation finds support in Model 1, 
where the coefficient for national conflict is positive and statistically significant. A one-unit 
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increase in the 5-point scale of national conflict is associated with an increase in EU lobbying 
of 8.3 percentage points relative to all EU and national (HQ) level lobbying, which represents 
an effect of considerable magnitude.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The expectation from Hypothesis 2 is that German firms place relatively greater emphasis on 
EU lobbying than British firms. In addition to the bivariate analysis presented in Figure 4, the 
country coefficient in Model 1 is statistically significant and in the expected direction, 
providing further support for Hypothesis 2. According to the estimate for Model 1, the 
proportion of time spent on EU lobbying relative to national-level lobbying is 21.5 percentage 
points lower for UK firms than for German firms. Of the control variables, the coefficient for 
foreign CPA is significant and in a positive direction. This suggests that the more a firm lobbies 
across borders the more freely it engages at the supranational level. 
 
In Model 2 we analyse the interaction between national conflict and country (UK = 1, Germany 
= 0) in order to test whether the effect of conflictual government-business relations at the 
national level on relative EU lobbying is greater for German firms than for British firms (H3). 
The coefficient for the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. To aid 
interpretation, Figure 6 shows how the effect of national conflict on relative EU lobbying is 
conditional on the national context, with bars representing the 95% confidence intervals. As 
the perceived level of national conflict with policymakers increases, German firms shift their 
lobbying effort from the national to the EU level, whereas increased levels of national conflict 
show no association with the relative lobby effort expended by British firms at the EU level. 
At the lower levels of domestic conflict, the ratio of EU to national lobbying is similar for firms 
from both countries. 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
To estimate whether there is a positive association for firms from both countries between 
relative EU lobbying and national conflict relative to EU-level conflict (H4), in Model 3 we 
interact relative conflict and country. The interaction effect is not statistically significant, 
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indicating that there is no slope difference between the two countries. This supports 
Hypothesis 4. To facilitate interpretation, we illustrate this effect in Figure 7. Taken together 
the estimates for the two interactions in Models 2 and 3 support the argument behind 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. While German firms shift venues in response to conflict, this is not a 
sufficient condition for British firms, who require greater certainty that shifting venues will 
lead to interactions with a more sympathetic policymaker (Proposition 4). 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that firms adapt their lobby strategies to changes in their political 
environment by shifting activities away from a venue with conflictual government-business 
relations to alternative venues (Proposition 1). We have also argued that these shifts take 
place within nationally distinct contexts represented by corporatist and pluralist political 
economic systems. In the contemporary EU, these make business lobbying at the EU level 
more attractive for firms from corporatist countries than for their pluralist counterparts 
(Proposition 2). These findings provide evidence for a process of change that has unfolded 
over the past quarter century. While Grant (1993) and others found direct firm lobbying at 
the level of the EC/EU to be dominated by firms from the pluralist systems of interest 
representation of the Anglo-Saxon world, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) found that by 2005 
differences in lobby behaviour between firms from pluralist and corporatist backgrounds had 
disappeared. Another decade later, the original difference seems to be reversed: according 
to our 2015 survey data, UK firms are more likely to lobby their national government while 
German firm are more likely to engage at the EU level. 
 
Moreover, the ability of firms to shift venues as the need arises is taken up more readily by 
firms from a corporatist background, who over the past 30 years have accumulated 
experience in both, negotiating multilevel political environments and adapting from 
corporatist to pluralist contexts (Proposition 3). This provides them with a strategic advantage 
over firms from the pluralist background of the UK, who did not expend great effort at 
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adapting to the supranational policy arena of the EU, as both, national pluralism and the EU’s 
system of interest representation encourage direct firm lobbying. Finally, we argued that 
differences between firms from pluralist and corporatist backgrounds should disappear when 
the quality of government-business relations at the EU level is taken into account in addition 
to the level of national conflict, because the calculus of relative conflict is shared by firms from 
both systems (Proposition 3). Our statistical analysis of firm-level survey data supports these 
propositions. Thus, we can infer that perceived conflict between firms and public authorities 
at the national level leads to increased business lobbying at the EU level. Moreover, while 
national institutions and types of interest representation shape relative business engagement 
at the EU level as well as the readiness of firms to shift venue, firms from any background 
seek to abandon conflictual lobbying environments if alternative venues look more promising.  
 
The analysis reported in this article contributes to the literatures on business lobbying and 
venue shopping in four principal ways: First, our findings support the claim by Bonardi, 
Hillman and Keim (2005) that the degree of attractiveness of a political market accounts for 
the extent to which a firm engages in political activities within that arena. By showing that 
firms from a pluralist background, unlike their corporatist peers, are willing to reduce political 
engagement in conflictual environments only when greener pastures are in sight, we add to 
this general argument that it is the relative attractiveness of political markets that matters for 
firms’ strategic choices. Second, while previous studies on venue shopping by companies 
restricted their explanatory factors to the country level (Ehrlich and Jones 2016) and at the 
sector level (e.g. Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009), assuming that the partisan composition of 
national governments or the regulation of a particular sector affects all firm within that 
country, resp. sector, equally. We have relaxed this assumption to allow for the possibility 
that some firms within the same country and even sector may find policymakers more 
receptive to their concerns than others have. Thus, compared with the previous literature, in 
the present article we have gone one level deeper into the political circumstances 
surrounding individual firms, who may experience different interactions with policymakers 
than other firms within the same country and/or sector. Our empirical analysis investigates 
this at two levels, firm and country, including interactions between variables across the two 
levels. Third, while the analyses by Ehrlich and Jones (2016) as well as Bernhagen and Mitchell 
(2009) were restricted to using data on EU-level lobbying by companies, our survey data 
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enables us to measure the relative importance of EU and national level lobbying as reported 
by companies’ public affairs managers. Fourth, by examining venue choices of European firms 
across levels of government, we contribute to the empirical literature on multilevel 
governance as well as the venue shopping literature. To the former (e.g. Eising 2004), we add 
the insights about the national-level constraints on the fluidity of political advocacy. To the 
latter, we add new evidence on vertical venue shifts to a literature that has been dominated 
by analysis of horizontal shifts at one and the same level of government (cf. Holyoke et al. 
2012).  
 
Through our study’s focus on the lobbying strategies of large businesses in the multilevel 
system, we have provided insights to the political activity of what are often considered the 
most economically powerful non-state actors in industrial democracies. These large 
internationally connected entities are the types of businesses that should have the ability to 
escape political context when they perceive the need to do so. Our analysis suggests that this 
ability is frequently put to use. However, firms’ responses to deteriorating government-
business relations in a particular venue are contingent on the institutional context. German 
firms place a bigger emphasis on EU lobbying compared with British firms. They are more 
readily willing to shift venues than British firms when national government-business relations 
deteriorate. However, under the right circumstances i.e. when EU-level government-business 
relations are perceived as being better than national-level relations, British firms are as ready 
to redeploy their lobby resources as their German peers. For the continued role of nationally 
distinct systems of interest representation, the sample of firms we analysed consists of least 
likely cases: Within their respective countries, these large firms are the least likely to be 
influenced by national legacies and patterns of interest representation. This provides us with 
confidence that the findings reported here would all be replicated if a sample of more and 
smaller firms were used.  
 
Finally, while our country cases contain two EU member states, one of these is currently 
preparing to leave the EU. UK business actors have, on average, been strong supporters of 
the country’s membership in the EU. We would expect that these actors will intensify their 
lobbying at both the national and EU level; to contain the damage incurred from ‘Brexit’ and 
to help secure single market membership for the UK. If the UK moved from EU membership 
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to a status similar to EEA membership, its business actors can be expected to behave more 
like Norwegian or Swiss firms: they should intensify their lobbying activity in Brussels as they 
will no longer have a government patron at the table but still be subject to the common 
market rules. In the less likely scenario that the UK exits without single market membership 
status, we should also see increases in business lobbying activity in Brussels, analogous to US 
business lobbying there. Thus, after German firms have overtaken British firms in their 
readiness to shift lobby resources from the national to the EU level by the time the data for 
the present study have been collected, the future may see a reversal of this trend. Even at 
present, however, British firms are somewhat more active in lobbying at the foreign national 
level than are German firms. This reflects a stronger anchoring in foreign governance 
structures relative to EU governance, suggesting, in turn, that British firms’ political strategy 
is relatively well suited for Brexit and its consequences. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of the relative EU lobbying measure 
 
 
Figure 2. German and British firms’ lobbying practise 
 
 
Note: the three within-country mean differences are statistically significant (t-test) at the 0.05 level: n= 54 
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Figure 3. Lobbying across policy types 
 
 
Note: The only significant (<0.05) difference is between regulatory and non-regulatory lobbying: n=54 
 
Figure 4. Comparing National & EU lobbying
 
Note: difference in means between German and British firms are significant (t-test) at the 0.05 level: n = 56 
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Figure 5. Comparing mean levels of conflict 
 
Note: difference in means between German and British firms are not significant: n = 56 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Interaction of national conflict and country of headquarter 
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Figure 7. Interaction of relative conflict and country of headquarter 
 
 
Table 1. Multivariate regression models of EU lobbying relative to national lobbying 
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-.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Relative EU / national level conflict
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
National Conflict 8.296*** 15.715***                
(3.09) (4.54)                
Relative Conflict 49.318*** 
(11.33)
Country (UK) -21.453*** 9.683 -18.655***
(6.51) (15.75) (5.85)
Revenue (log) 3.815 5.207* 4.61
(3.18) (2.73) (2.92)
Financial sector 7.09 3.198 0.32
(8.73) (7.93) (10.42)
Foreign CPA 0.544** 0.555** 0.304
(0.24) (0.22) (0.28)
NatConflict*UK -14.210**                
(6.06)                
RelativeConflict*UK -17.912
(23.02)
constant -12.476 -42.36 4.67
(30.96) (31.15) (30.75)
R-sqr 0.4 0.47 0.5
n 46 46 44
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01    
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1 Since our sample of from the UK includes no firms from Northern Ireland, in the remainder of the article we 
simply refer to ‘British firms’. 
2 We initially sampled 100 companies from Germany and the UK, but increased the country-n to 104 and 107, 
respectively, to compensate for low responses rates.  
3 Following established practice in the literature, size is measured by revenues in million US Dollars made 
during the financial year 2012. Profit is gross profit revenues in million US Dollars realized during 2012. Assets 
are total current assets of the corporation in million US Dollars in 2012, while the number of employees is the 
total number of employees of a corporation for that year. 
4 Other venues prompted are ‘national governments of other countries in which your company has facilities, 
markets and / or suppliers, ‘regional institutions (e.g. the European Union or NAFTA), ‘international / global 
institutions (e.g. WTO, UN, UNCCC)’, and ‘international private standard-setting bodies (e.g. ISO or 
International Electrotechnical Commission)’. 
5 Firms are coded as within the ‘financial sector’ if their main activity falls within the SIC Code Division H 
(‘Finance, insurance, & real estate’). We have also estimated all models with a dummy variable indicating the 
manufacturing instead of the financial sector (together these two sectors comprise 56% of sample). This does 
not affect the substantive results reported here (see appendix A2). Due to limited degrees of freedom we 
present the theoretically more interesting findings controlling for financial sector. 
6 British firms are somewhat more active in lobbying at foreign national level than German firms. This reflects a 
stronger anchoring in foreign governance structures relative to EU governance. 
7 Respondents were asked, ‘[i]n the policy areas that you selected above, in which of the following ways did 
you express your position to policymakers?’. Responses are non-exclusive and comprise of ‘approach 
policymakers directly ourselves’, ‘enlist the services of external consultants’, ‘work through a trade 
association’, and ‘other’. For this question we received 54 responses. 
8 Here and in Figure 2, a mean of 1 would indicate that all firms adopt a particular mode of lobbying, whereas a 
value of 0 would suggest that none of them do. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Summary statistics 
 
 
Table A2. Multivariate regression models of EU lobbying relative to national 
lobbying, with financial sector replaced with manufacturing sector 
 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Relative EU lobbying 48 41.7 25.2 0 90
Relative National lobbying 50 59.9 26.1 10 100
National conflict 56 2.25 1 1 4
EU conflict 56 2.3 0.9 1 4
Relative conflict 51 0 0.3 -0.6 0.6
Revenue (data logged) 56 9.4 1.1 6.2 11.5
Financial sector 56 0.15 0.36 0 1
Foreign CPA 51 19 14.5 0 75
Direct lobbying 54 0.79 0.42 0 1
Lobbying via consultant 54 0.15 0.35 0 1
Lobbying via trade assoc. 54   0.59 0.51 0 1
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
National Conflict 7.694** 14.959***                
(-3.85) (-3.76)                
Relative Conflict 47.627*** 
(-12.27)
Country (UK) -17.903*** 12.131 -15.876***
(-6.79) (-13.61) (-5.82)
Revenue (log) 2.039 3.886 3.572
(-3.33) (-3.301) (-2.56)
Manufacturing sector 10.886 9.767 9.506
(-7.53) (-5.48) (-6.02)
Foreign CPA 0.380* 0.431* 0.213
(-0.23) (-0.33) (-0.23)
NatConflict*UK -14.009***                
(-6.06)                
RelativeConflict*UK -16.858
(-19.62)
constant 3.41 -31.068 10.514
(-32.1) (-31.15) (-25.97)
R-sqr 0.4 0.47 0.5
n 46 46 44
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01    
